Showing posts with label thesis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label thesis. Show all posts

Thursday, June 19, 2008

ABB: Well Positioned to Create Value in "Energy Efficiency" 
One exciting investment opportunity identified through a fundamental/earnings quality screen that I run periodically is ABB Ltd. ABB is a Swiss conglomerate that provides a wide range of products and services to the power and automation markets. A recent earnings warning from Siemens, another European conglomerate that competes in similar markets, dragged the stock down in sympathy, and now trades at an earnings multiple slightly less than its long term growth rate. I felt the problems at Siemens were company specific, and the market reaction of ABB was unwarranted, creating an opportunity for long term investors to own a great business at a reasonable price.

The investment thesis on ABB is relatively straightforward. ABB has smartly positioned itself as an “energy efficiency” solution provider. Its products & services can be found at every node of the energy value spectrum, resource production, transportation, por generation, por transmission & distribution, and even consumption. Here is a sampling of the types of solutions that ABB offers:


  • motors that efficiently por deep-sea drilling rigs
  • marine propulsion systems that transport the oil
  • substations, circuit breakers, capacitors used in electricity generation
  • high, medium, low voltage transformers used to transmit and distribute energy across
  • power grid automation, robotics, and variable speed drives/motors that drastically reduce industrial consumption
ABB is well positioned competitively to maintain its leadership status in most of the markets it serves. An enormous installed base, economies of scale, and a core competency in efficiency solutions provides the company with an enviable competitive moat. It's industry leading R&D budget that has generated a voluminous portfolio of intellectual property and innovative new products has galvanized this edge over the competition. Lastly its global footprint positions ABB favorably to benefit from rapidly growing emerging markets. Only 15% of revenues are generated in the US, and almost 40% from fast growing emerging markets. Interestingly, its leading market share in Asia is likely remain firm, as customers in that part of the world place greater emphasis on business relationships, and are more likely to award new contracts to their existing network of suppliers, a Chinese social custom known as Guanxi.

New Infrastructure needs to be built to support electricity demand in emerging markets-
As a provider of infrastructure & energy efficiency, ABB finds itself in a “perfect storm” of end-market demand. Emerging market electricity demand is expected to grow from 8B kilowatts per hour to 16B kw/h over the next 20 years. As population and GDP grows in these parts of the world, new infrastructure will be required to provide the energy to fuel that growth.



Existing Infrastructure in developed markets needs to be replaced -
Wall St. as ll as the entire northeastern US remember the summer of 2005 por outage in that left more than 20% of the US population in the dark for nearly 24 hours. A huge capital investment cycle in the 1960’s and 1970’s follod by a long period of neglect has left the US por grid in brittle condition, and as the head of the EIA describes, “one or two heat waves” away from crisis. The average US transformer is over 40 years old, ll beyond the average life expectancy for that type of equipment.



Energy Efficiency – The low hanging fruit of the green movement. While less “sexy” than other green investment opportunities, efficiency improvements are the low hanging fruit of the energy problem. 65% of energy use and CO2 pollution can be attributed to motors and engines. ABB’s variable speed drives and motors can significantly lor energy consumption and pollutants, yet in the US are used marginally (only 5% penetration). For perspective, consider that the installed base of these drives/motors in Europe has reduced annual consumption of energy to a level equivalent to 32mm households (1/3 US households!) and reduced yearly CO2 tonnage by the amount that the entire country of Ireland emits on an annual basis. Throughout the energy value chain, ABB believes it can reduce waste by about 20%, generating low-risk, high return on investment opportunities that businesses and governments will find hard to walk away from.

Renewable Momentum – Remote energy sources (solar/wind) will require transmission
Renewables – Public & legislative momentum as ll economic parity with traditional coal, gas, & nuclear fired por plants, is stimulating demand for renewable energy sources around the globe. While wind and solar por have become a meaningful part of the European por grid, the US still only generates about 2% of its electricity needs from such sources. Because renewable por sources are often great distances from the population centers that they serve (think Arizona!), infrastructure such as high voltage transformers must be used to effectively distribute the energy. ABB is the #1 player in this type of equipment.

Catalysts & Low Expectations may drive upside surprise for investors
In addition to these growth drivers, ABB has a great balance sheet, which could be a catalyst for the stock. The company has paid off most of its debt and now boasts a net cash position of over $6B, which can be used as competitive ammunition, for strategic M&A, or simply can be returned to shareholders through dividend or share buybacks. Expectations are modest relative to recent results, and believe the 10% earnings growth that Wall St. is anticipating will be easily surpassed. A closer look at the company backlog reveals a visible stream of high margin revenue yet to be realized.

Fundamentals & Valuation very attractive – Price target of $43
Returns for the company have been strong. Margins have grown from 5% to almost 12%, and the company sees 18% margins down the road as internal goals are met. Return on invested capital is ll over 20% highlighting quality management and focus on creating shareholder value.

Valuation is reasonable. For a company growing earnings at a 20% rate over the long term, a P/E of 18 represents a fair value in our opinion. This is a 20% premium to the market, but would argue growth prospects and profitability deserve an even greater premium. I am also comforted by the free cash flow yield of just over 4%, and annual free cash flow generation of about $4B. Using relatively modest assumptions (about 10% long term growth) and a 8% discount rate, I arrived at an intrinsic value of about $43 for the shares.  In conclusion, I found it difficult to poke holes in this investment case. While the world adjusts to $130 oil, terrorism, and a rapidly growing population, ABB’s products and services address some very real problems. We may not be able to find more energy, and it may take several years to find alternatives, ABB offers solutions to get much more out of what have, today.

Saturday, February 16, 2008

How Mother Nature Can Grow Your Portfolio

If a tree falls in the woods, does Wall Street hear it? Clearly not, judging by the wide discounts to intrinsic value being awarded to names in the Timber REIT sector. Based on my analysis of private market value, the three largest timber REITs, Plum Creek, Rayonier, and particularly Potlatch Corp. offer investors a wide margin of safety, relatively stable cash flows, and a healthy dividend yield.

Perhaps the most compelling argument for an investment in timber lies in the risk reduction benefits that timber can add to a growth focused portfolio. Backtesting 20 years of data from the NAREIT Timberland Index, in addition to a portfolio of US stocks, intl developed, emerging markets, and bonds reveals remarkably low correlation, while generating long term returns of almost 14%. The correlation with equities was less than 10%, providing "bond-like" diversification, with returns that would be expected from smallcap or emerging markets. As these risk/return characteristics continue to improve the opportunities along the
efficient frontier, the optimization models that institutional investors base their asset allocation on will continue to overweight this asset class. Many highly regarded asset allocation gurus, such as David Swensen, who manages the Yale endowment, have been long time proponents of adding real assets, such as timber, to a well diversified portfolio. That said, as of this past Decemeber, the average institutional portfolio only held about 1% of their assets in timber, a far lower allocation than the efficient frontier would suggest as optimal.

Within the Timber REIT sector, one of the more attractive companies is Potlatch Indstries. Potlatch owns about 1.7mm acres of timberland in Arkansas, Minnesota, and Idaho. The company is vertically integrated with higher margin businesses such as resources (timber harvesting) and real estate sales, offset by its lower margin, downstream businesses such as wood products (lumber), pulp/paperboard manufacturing, and consumer products (off-label tissues). This provides the company with numerous growth levers and allows
them to more effectively manage volatility in its business. For example if timber pricing is weak, the company may delay its harvesting activities, choosing instead to generate cash with its manufacturing operations and real estate sales. Importantly, there is minimal opportunity cost when the company delays its timber harvest as trees continue to grow biologically. On average, trees grow between 3-6% per year.

After recently filling the CFO post with Eric Cremers, who recently orchestrated the splitup of Albertsons, it is clear that the company is focused on creating value for shareholders. Based on my analysis, there is plenty of value that can be monetized. Using data from 30 of the largest private market transactions over the last 5 years, US timberlands have been sold at roughly $800 per acre. The most recent data, published by industry journal, Timber Mart South, indicates timberland transactions have been averaging $1400 per acre. Lets be conservative, and use the 5 year average. The company also has 225k acres of HBU land (or higher or better
use land) that the company conservatively believes can be sold at $2000 to $4000. After conferring with industry sources, and considering that competitors Plum Creek and Rayonier value their comparable HBU land at $4000 to $10000, using $2000 per acre as a base-case scenario should provide a margin a safety in the analysis. Assigning these values to the 1.5mm timberland acres and the 225k HBU acres, subtracting debt, and applying a trough 6x EBITDA multiple to the the manufacturing businesses implies a total enterprise value of about $56 per share for Potlatch. At its current $40 stock price, the risk reward is quite favorable. Furthermore, a dividend yield of 5% should offer investors a healthy stream of income as we
patiently await for catalyst to develop and the intrinsic value to be realized.

Thursday, November 29, 2007

Adobe Corp: Riding the Wave of Web 2.0
Given the recent volatility in the market, I have slightly modified my screening process placing a slightly greater emphasis on strong topline growth, earnings consistency & clean balance sheets, the qualities of companies that tend to trade well during times of economic uncertainty. Obviously, I am not the only investor seeking a safe haven in this market, and the redirection of money flow into these stocks has driven their prices and P/E ratios up. Stocks like Proctor & Gamble and Microsoft are at their 52 week highs and trade at P/E multiples much higher than historical averages. Although my investment approach is rooted in value investing, I am willing to pay a premium for stability in this environment. After all, the great Warren Buffet has even been known to pay up for quality during times of turmoil, as evidenced by Berkshire's late 1980's purchases Coca Cola and Gillette.

My search has led me to Adobe Corp. Most everyone that owns a computer in the developed world has at one time or another used Adobe Acrobat(900mm installed base). Adobe utilizes a "reverse razor blade" strategy by distributing free copies of its reader product to PC manufacturers, and generating its profits on sales of its writers, or applications used to create communications in PDF. format. This creates enormous competitive moat for the company and allows it to generate strong returns on its invested capital.

Not only does the company have strong competitive position, but several growth catalysts are emerging that should increase the visibility of earnings growth and likelihood of upward revisions. From an industry perspective, the outlook is bright. Enterprise roll-outs of Vista (Microsoft) and insatiable consumer demand for notebooks is expected to support PC/Notebook shipment growth of over 11%-13% according to Gartner and IDC forecasts. Most of these machines will come pre-installed with Acrobat software. Furthermore, the popularity of web-communities such as myspace and youtube is resulting in exponential growth in the number of websites and the need for creative content solutions.


Internally, the company is intently focused on its recent launch of CS3 (Creative Suite 3), a suite of tools used by creative professionals and consumers that want to use computers to create their own websites, blogs, and share media with family and friends. With the recent acquisition on Macro-media, known for their popular flashplayer technology, the new product offers much greater video functionality for web-developers and should generate significantly higher per unit margins than previous rollouts. Since 2003 the average selling price of ADBE's product mix has grown from about $250 to $400. This trend should continue. Going back 20 years, I found a strong correlation between product launches and accelerating sales trends. Given that CS3 is anticipated to be the most successful launch ever for the company, revenues are poised to follow the historical pattern of post-launch growth. On its most recent conference call Adobe management pointed out that penetration rates among creative professionals are 40% higher than previous releases at this point in the product roll-out cycle (launch + 6 months), due to the products growing popularity and enhanced functionality.


Additionally, new product launches in mobile applications should gain traction in 2008. The number of of "flash enabled" devices sold per year has grown from about 50mm to 250mm in just the last 3 years. Interestingly, most of the developing world (and over 60% of the worlds population) will access the internet for the first time via a mobile device, so the enormous opportunity here is clear. There are indications that the company will launch a mobile product in 2008.

Lastly, the company is making significant strides within the enterprise marketplace through a recently announced partnership with SAP which should dramatically increase the Adobe value proposition within large organizations. Longer term, the company has been beta testing a new html-based architecture known as AIR that will make web content creation much more accessible to the masses. As the operating system continues to look more and more like a home-page, applications such as AIR will be at sweet spot of this technological evolution. At a recent conference management indicated that internally, they think AIR has the potential to do for internet content development what Acrobat did for document management. The company expects numerous product launches based on the AIR technology, as this next generation "razor blade" gains mass acceptance.

Fundamentals & Valuation
The company should earn about $1.85 next year, which means it trades at about 22x earnings at the current price of 42. They do have over $6B in cash & equivalents on the balance sheet, so adjusting for cash we are paying about 19X, not cheap, but not ridiculous either for a company that generates ROE's of 25% and is expected to grow at 16% over next several years. I also like to look at free cash flow, and as expected with any software company, Adobe is a cash machine. The company has well over $1B in cash flow earning power, which is healthy for a company with an net enterprise value of about $18B. Based on my DCF analysis, which assumes consensus growth rates, a discount factor of 10%, and a terminal multiple of 18X, the stock is intrinsically worth about $50 per share, a modest margin of safety.

This isnt a classic value stock, and any execution missteps with the new management team do pose a real risk to the thesis given the premium we are paying. I have met the new management team, and they have been well groomed internally, and largely seem to be thoughtful, shareholder friendly managers. Not a risk free story, but when the market gyrations have you reaching for the Pepto, a stock like Adobe, might let you sleep a little better.

Thursday, May 31, 2007

TJX, a high quality retailer in the bargain bin....


The recent credit card breach at TJMaxx has evoked loud criticism from all corners of the investment and political spectrum over the company's lax security measures. Some have gone as far as to equate the companies actions as those of the criminals themselves. In a recent Lightening Round on Cramers Mad Money, when asked his view of the stock, Jim declared that TJX is a "mismanaged" company. Perhaps had he given more than the 12 allotted seconds to deliberate each stock idea, he may have constructed a more thoughtful position.

While I am concerned that more stringent controls were not in place before the breach, I view TJX as more a victim than culprit in this situation. I love when short term issues like this give us the opportunity as long term investors to buy and hold great companies until the market lets them out of the penalty box. I must say, I have to respectfully disagree with Cramer’s conclusion however that TJX is a “mismanaged” company. Having done significant work on the drivers of outperformance in the retailing space, I have concluded that the winners are usually the companies that #1 can generate the highest return on shareholders capital & #2 can sustain strong “same store sales”

Because TJX employs a unique business model that emphasizes operating highly efficient stores and delivering value to the consumer and focuses less on developing fancy store layouts and concepts, they consistently earn higher return on invested capital than their peer group. TJX turns its inventory much faster than most peers, which creates value in three important ways. The faster inventory turnover enables TJMaxx to generate higher levels of cash flow as less working capital is needed to finance the inventory. Capital expenditures also tend to be lower as store concepts are lower priority, and stores do not need to be renovated every three years to remain "trendy", As the chart below illustrates, TJX has one of the highest levels of free cash flow earning power in the retailing sector, a financial metric which is typically associated with higher valuations and stock prices. Secondly, the brisk turnover model creates huge value proposition for its suppliers, providing the clothing manufacturers and department stores an additional channel of distribution and allows them to optimize their merchandising. Finally, the model lowers the financial risk profile for TJX as fashion risks are minimized.

It is difficult, in the long run, to make money on stocks that have high fashion risk, companies that can often be victim to consumers rapidly changing tastes, i.e. the Gap, Krispy Kreme, and Cramer’s favorites like Crocs and Under-Armor. Sure, some will succeed, but getting the merchandise strategy right is another uncontrollable variable in the mix.

TJX has much less risk because if it makes a fashion blunder, it has much shorter lead-times and can quickly adjust its merchandising. Other companies could have several quarters of earnings misses if it makes poor merchandising decisions as purchasing decisions are made several months in advance.

In terms of growth, TJX has strong unit growth potential in some of its newer concepts, but more importantly it grows its “same store sales” much more consistently than most retailers. The attached charts show how TJX has a very loyal customer base (we call them “treasure hunters”) and in fact in slowing periods TJX tends to attract marginal customers that trade down from higher-end retail.


These are signs of very solid management and I remain confident that over our longer frame investment time horizon, this thesis should materialize and we will see a solid return.

Friday, March 02, 2007











Syngenta - Planting the seeds of growth....
Currently there is a compelling argument for a sustained period of growth in the agriculture markets as demand from bio-fuels such as ethanol, and feed exports to emerging markets overwhelm current supplies. The widely followed “stock-to-use” metric suggests that ending inventories of corn will be less than 10% of annual consumption, a level not seen in over 40 years. In 1996, the stock-to-use ratio declined below 20%, causing a nearly 200% increase in corn prices. In fact, if we were to assume flat demand next year, and yields were to improve at the same rate they have been improving (about 8% year trend), we would end the year with a shortage of corn bushels, forcing the U.S. to become a net importer. What’s troubling is that most of the data suggests demand will actually increase next year, making continued grain price rallies more likely. Currently there are approximately 100 ethanol plants in operation in the US. Over the 2007-2008 time period, about 85 additional ethanol facilities are expected to complete construction, and begin operation, further increasing demand for agricultural inputs. Furthermore, emerging economies are becoming more and more dependent on corn feed as their populations demand more protein in their diets. As more acreage is planted for corn, less is planted of other crops, driving up their prices as well. It is likely that as more and more technological advancements in cellulosic ethanol and other bio-fuels are made, the role of agribusiness and improving yields will be increasingly higher on the value chain.
These exciting developments in agriculture encouraged me to focus my screening efforts within this industry. Importantly, I sought to find a company with exposure to these trends, but one that would fit within my disciplined investment process and met my fundamentally based criterion, which led me to Syngenta (SYT). Syngenta is a Swiss- based company that manufactures and markets crop protection and agricultural seed products. The company was formed in 2000, when the agri-business segments of Novartis and AstraZeneca, where spun-out and merged together to more effectively compete with DuPont and Monsanto.
Here are some of the main points of this thesis
1. Crop protection business is a “cash cow” that can be used to fund growth
Today, Syngenta is the global leader in crop protection (insecticides, fungicides) with about 20% global market share (market size is roughly $30billion). This segment accounts for about 80% of the company’s current sales mix. The primary reason that the stock trades at a discount is because of its exposure to this slower growth business. Most analysts believe that about 5-10% of the crop protection market is at risk from new seed technologies, which limits the growth attributable to acreage growth and new products to only 1-2% per year. In my view, while this is a slower growth business, it still offers very strong margins and cash flow to fund other growth initiatives within the business. Furthermore, I expect the introduction of several new products to allow the company to charge higher prices and generate stronger profits, even if the top-line growth moderates.
2. 2007 and 2008 product introductions in bio-tech (GM) seeds can significantly accelerate profit growth
The company also has a significant presence in seeds, where it is the #3 player globally, with about 10% market share of the $15B world seed market, and about 15% of the U.S. market. In the seeds business the primary competition is from Monsanto, which has about 30% of the market, and DuPont, the #2 player with about 25% share. The seed market is therefore highly oligopolistic, and has significant barriers to entry and reasonable pricing power. The primary knock on Syngenta is that it is late to the game in the faster growing biotech (genetically modified) seed market. Currently, it takes about 4 years for a seed to be developed and to sufficiently breed enough quantities of it to distribute. While DuPont and Monsanto have debuted their “double” and “triple stack traits” recently (double-stack is seed with two significant biotech traits), Syngenta was somewhat late, and won’t offer a double stack trait until mid-2007 and a triple stack in 2008 (just recently approved by U.S. agencies). That said, if Syngenta migrate only a small % of its conventional seed customers toward its new products, it will generate significant profits. The double and triple stack products generate nearly twice the profitability as conventional seeds and will have a powerful impact on net income.
3. Syngenta has the best business fundamentals in the peer group. Syngenta has stronger return on equity trends (evidence of well managed company), a better balance sheet, and generates more free cash flow than peers.

4. Syngenta, because it is slightly late to the “bio-tech party”, and has some slower growth segments trades at a significant (and undeserved) discount to Monsanto.

This disconnect will be likely be narrowed if the company can show just moderate amount of success with new product introductions, and others begin to see the relative value in this name. In fact, assuming just moderate margin expansion and EPS growth of about 14% over the next 5 years, a discounted cash flow analysis yields value 30% higher than the current price. Monsanto trades at over 34 times earnings, while Syngenta trades just slightly above the market multiple at 17.5X (almost 50% of Monsanto’s valuation!!). DuPont trades at about 15X, but has about 50% of its business tied to highly cyclical housing and automotive markets. In my view, this is a “safer” way to play this trend in agriculture.





Wednesday, March 08, 2006

Tuesday, March 07, 2006


While it could certainly be argued that HCC is more a "GARP" stock than a value stock, I feel the unique business model and competitive advantage justify paying a little more to own this holding. Trading at about 2.0x book value, HCC is not at the bottom of the barrell relative to other insurance companies. With a P/E of 11x forward earnings however, it is by no way over-valued, particularly when you consider the highly visible earnings stream.HCC, originally known as Houston Causualty Corp. is a small-cap multi-line P&C insurer. The company predominantly focuses on writing policies in highly specialized niche markets, where market ineffieciencies allow for high underwriting profits. For example the company may write a policy for an event cancellation by a rock band, or kidnapping insurance for a prominant political figure, basically markets where competition is low and rates are determined by convienence and level of service. Over the last 10 years HCC has managed to generate an underwriting profit 9 times. (read Warren Buffets annual letter to shareholders to understand the importance of underwriting profit)

Importantly the business generates revenue both through taking on risk as well as through fee and commission based agency services. This is unique in the insurance industry and provides HCC with a strong competitive advantage against its peers. In 1992 when Hurricane Andrew devastated Florida and drove "hard" pricing in the P&C insurance industry, HCC used it's strong balance sheet and wrote an abnormally large number of policies, bought less reinsurance, and relied less on its fee-based agency business, in search of above average underwriting profit. During the mid 1990's as new capital was attracted to the industry, prices (per unit of risk) came down and margins declined. Seeing this, HCC wrote less policies, bought more re-insurance, and relied on fee and commission revenues to grow the business. After 9/11, when the market recovered HCC responded....This additional lever gives HCC the ability to continue to grow through the rough times. Over the last 10 years the book value growth of HCC has strongly outperformed the industry. (see chart below)


Management owns a significant amount of stock and manages the company and the risk it accepts very prudently. Over the last several years this is evidenced by the series of positive earnings surprizes and relatively few reserve adjustments. Going forward, given the recent natural distasters, pricing is likely to improve for the policies that HCC writes and improve the profitability of the company. In my view, 2x book value and 11x earnings is a fair if not cheap price to pay for such a quality company

Monday, March 06, 2006

Walter Industries is a company that is not well understood by most investors, and I feel, trading at a level significantly below its intrinsic value. Because Walter operates in traditionally “un-sexy” industries and has a relatively poor record of profit generation, this company has flown under the radar screens of most Wall St. analysts and portfolio managers. Even after posting a 300% return in 2005 and growing its market value well into mid-cap land, the stock is still only covered by 2 lesser known brokerage firms.

In my view the company has some assets that most investors may not fully appreciate. Currently Walter operates 3 segments, a homebuilding division that manufactures and provides financing for low priced modular homes sold largely to customers in the Southeast, an industrial segment that makes ductile iron pipe, or the heavy duty pipe used in water distribution systems, and a coal mining division that operates 5 mines in northern Alabama. While the money losing homebuilding has traditionally captured all the headlines, effectively scaring away the “housing bubble” crowd, I am more focused on the value of the industrial and coal businesses.

Lets start with the industrial or water pipe business. Late in 2005 the company acquired privately held Mueller Industries, increasing the contribution of this segment to about 60% of sales and 50% of operating profit. The well publicized “water crisis” resulting from an aging U.S. water infrastructure has driven demand for Walter-Mueller products. Furthermore, Walter-Mueller has a significant competitive advantage in the location of its manufacturing; its New Jersey and California facilities are in close proximity to the areas of the country where infrastructure is needed most the fast growing sunbelt, and the metropolitan areas of New York, Philadelphia, and Boston, where current systems are over 100 years old. In Q4-05 these businesses generated roughly 75mm in EBITDA. If we do a simplified analysis and extrapolate this seasonally weak quarter, this segment has roughly 300mm in annual earning power. Most public companies is this space trade at roughly 8x EBITDA, implying that this segment is worth 2.4Billion

The coal business looks even more interesting. The type of coal that WLT mines is called metallurgical or “met” coal. This is the type of coal used in the steelmaking process, and strong demand, particularly from China is driving the price over the $100 per ton level, nearly 3x the price of its soft, high-sulfur counterpart “steam” coal that is used in power plants. During the most recent quarter WLT was booking average prices of about $99 per ton for their coal, but management was hesitant to comment on 2006 prices as coal contracts are currently in the negotiation process. The total cash costs of extracting this coal are about 52-54 per ton, implying about $48 in EBITDA per ton extracted. The company anticipates mining about 7mm tons in 2006, and production is expected to grow by more than 30% over the next 3 years. If these prices hold, it is feasible that the company could generate $326 in cash flow this year. Applying the coal industry average multiple of 10x, yields a value of this business over 3.2B

Ignoring the homebuilding business, which when coupled with its financing arm is generating a small and growing profit, these two businesses could be worth 5.6 billion. Subtract 1.5B in debt that is attributable to these operations, and we are left with 4.1 billion in value or $100 per share. While the analysis has been simplified, the stock trades at a significant discount (currently $65), and there is plenty of room for error here.

Lastly, there are several catalysts on the horizon. The company plans to break up the divisions eventually so that homebuilding, natural resources, and industrial, can hopefully earn the respect (and multiples!) they deserve. News-flow surrounding new coal contract negotiations could also provide a lift for the shares. Lastly, a high concentration of activist shareholders on the top ten owners list is sure to drive management to create value.